The “Animus” Briefs: Attacks on the Seventh Circuit’s Sound Analysis of Transgender Bathroom Rights in Public Schools by Brennan B. Hutson
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 1 Seventh Circuit Review Fall 2017 Article 8 
10-24-2018 
The “Animus” Briefs: Attacks on the Seventh Circuit’s Sound 
Analysis of Transgender Bathroom Rights in Public Schools 
Brennan B. Hutson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brennan B. Hutson, The “Animus” Briefs: Attacks on the Seventh Circuit’s Sound Analysis of Transgender 
Bathroom Rights in Public Schools, 13 Seventh Circuit Rev. 222 (2017). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/8 
This Civil Rights is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 




THE “ANIMUS” BRIEFS:  
ATTACKS ON THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S SOUND 
ANALYSIS OF TRANSGENDER BATHROOM 







Cite as: Brennan B. Hutson, The “Animus” Briefs: Attacks on the Seventh Circuit’s 
Sound Analysis of Transgender Bathroom Rights in Public Schools, 13 SEVENTH 






 The Seventh Circuit recently granted a preliminary injunction to 
permit a transgender high school student to use the bathroom in 
accordance with his gender identity, striking down the school district’s 
unwritten sex-based bathroom policy.
1
 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit 
has created the nation’s only firm sanctuary from bathroom 
discrimination for transgender students.  
 The school district petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of the United States.
23
 The amicus briefs in support of 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1
 Whitaker by Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 
F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 28, 2017) (No. 17-301).  
2
 Id.  
3
 In the intervening time between writing and publishing this Comment, Ashton 
graduated from high school and the Kenosha School District has settled the matter 
with Ashton Whitaker for $800,000.00. See Fortin, Jacey, Transgender Student’s 
Discrimination Suit is Settled for $800,000.00, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan 10, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/us/transgender-wisconsin-school-lawsuit.html. 
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the school district’s petition appeal to speculative fear and 
misrepresent the established law upon which the Seventh Circuit relied 
in reaching its pro-transgender decision. Likewise, the Supreme Court 
of the United States, the Department of Justice, and the Department of 




 Part I of this Comment lays a foundation of necessary contextual 
information for understanding transgender rights. It also explains 
various terms essential to analysis of transgender issues and discusses 
problems transgender individuals face on a routine basis.
5
  Part II 
presents the legal context in which transgender bathroom rights in 
public schools arise, including relevant statutes and subsequent 
judicial precedent. Part III delves into the Seventh Circuit’s grant of 
injunction in favor of a transgender high school student in Whitaker 
Ex. Rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha School District, barring the school 
district from enforcing its unwritten sex-classification bathroom 
policy.
6
 Part IV discusses the movement against transgender rights, 
                                                                                                                   
This specific case will not reach the Supreme Court of the United States, but the 
issue of transgender bathroom policies in public schools will likely return before the 
Court; one student living in the Seventh Circuit has already filed suit against his 
Indiana high school. See Hussein, Fatima, Transgender High Schooler Sues 




 Casual observers of news and social media in 2017 are likely aware of the 
rising tide against transgender individuals. That animus is codified in the actions of 
the Attorney General and the White House.  See STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY 
GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF TITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 
(D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633; see also Tillett, Emily, Trump Announces Military Ban 




 This Comment recognizes that gender and sexuality are fluid concepts that 
occur on a spectrum, and human beings often do not fit neatly into one category. See 
The Kinsey Scale, KINSEY INSTITUTE OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, 
https://www.kinseyinstitute.org/research/publications/kinsey-scale.php  (last 
accessed Nov. 21, 2017).  
6
 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1034.  
2
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specifically focusing on the amicus briefs submitted in favor of the 
Kenosha School District’s writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. Finally, this Comment concludes by arguing that the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis of transgender issues is the only appropriate 
analysis under existing law, urges the Supreme Court and other courts 
to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, and further argues that the 
arguments levied in the amicus briefs are predominantly rooted in 
animus, not sound legal analysis.  
 
I. WHAT IS A TRANSGENDER PERSON? 
 
 “Transgender” is “an umbrella term for person whose gender 
identity or expression (masculine, feminine, other) is different from 
their sex (male, female) at birth.”
7
  Understanding the distinction 
between “sex” and “gender identity” is essential to understanding 
transgendered people. “Sex” refers to the biological DNA makeup of a 
human being that determines that human’s reproductive organs.
8
 Over 
99% of humans are born with chromosomes and sex organs that are 
either male or female.
9
 This binary is present in nearly all mammals.
10
 
Essentially, sex is an objective measure of whether an individual has 
reproductive organs with sperm that can fertilize eggs during the 
reproductive process (male), or sex organs with eggs that can be 
fertilized during the reproductive process (female).
11
  
                                                 
7
 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/transgender.htm. 
8





 How Commons Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA (last 
visited Sep. 30, 2017), http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency. 
10
 WERNER A MUELLER ET AL.,,. DEVELOPMENT AND REPRODUCTION IN 
HUMANS AND ANIMAL MODEL SPECIES (2015).  
11
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 Gender, by contrast, refers to societal and cultural expectations of 
individuals based on his or her sex.
12
 This concept is succinctly 
illustrated by the history of clothing for young children in the United 
States. An 1884 photograph of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt as 
a toddler shows the young boy with: (1) long, curly locks of hair; (2) a 
knee-length pink dress; (3) an ornate frilly hat with a ribbon on it; and 
(4) Mary Jane shoes with calf-high socks.
13
 The social convention in 
1884 expected young boys to wear dresses until age 6 or 7, which was 
the time of their first haircut.
14
 This trend lasted for some time; in June 
of 1918, an article from “Earnshaw’s Infants’ Department Store” 
explained that “the generally accepted rule is pink for the boys, and 
blue for the girls.”
15
 Over time, that trend switched. American culture 
now widely accepts that pink clothing and accessories are appropriate 
for female babies and blue for male babies. This assignment is so 
engrained in the culture that a 2017 Buick Encore commercial features 
a woman going to a baby shower with a pink cake and subsequently 
rushing around town trying to get a blue cake because she learned last-
minute that the baby was a male.
16
  
 This arbitrary switch in males’ baby clothing from pink to blue is 
a perfect example of how society’s own stereotypes about sex 
assignment are purely social in construction. Baby males and baby 
females do not choose their clothing and nothing about the two colors 
is innately tied to sex organs. Yet baby males are overwhelming 
dressed in blue while baby females are overwhelmingly dressed in 
pink. Thus, this color assignment exists purely because of external 
societal pressures.  
                                                 
12
 Krieger, Nancy, Genders, sexes, and health: What are the connections- and 
why does it matter? INT. J. EPID. 34(4):652-7 (Aug. 2003).  
13
 Maglaty, Jeanne, When Did Girls Start Wearing Pink? SMITHSONIAN 
MAGAZINE (April 4, 2011), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/when-
did-girls-start-wearing-pink-1370097/?no-ist. 
14
 Id.  
15
 Id.  
16
 About 2017 Buick Encore Preferred TV Commercial, 'Baby Shower' Song by 
Matt and Kim ISPOT.TV (last visited Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.ispot.tv/ad/wAxW/2017-buick-encore-oh-boy. 
4
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 When children grow up, these stereotypes based on sex evolve: 
male children are often expected to wear short hair, play sports, 
wrestle with other males, or play with toy vehicles and army figures. 
By contrast, female children are expected to be dainty and gentle, wear 
dresses, or play with dolls. Adult males are often expected to be rough, 
strong, short-haired, independent, and aggressive; adult females are 
often expected to be submissive, gentle, small, friendly, and pretty. 
These expectations (or stereotypes) may aptly apply to many males 
and females, but of course society is full of females who are rough, 
strong, short-haired, independent and aggressive (and vice versa). The 
discrepancy between societal expectations on the basis of sex and each 
individual’s desire to embrace those expectations creates a vast, fluid 
gender identity scale.  
 “Gender identity” refers to an individual’s own internal 
understanding of one’s own gender.
17
 “Gender expression” is a term 
“used to describe one’s outward presentation of their gender.”
18
 A 
male adult who internally feels more aligned with society’s 
expectations of female adults may take steps to transition from a man 
to a woman by wearing clothing, makeup, jewelry, shoes, hair 
products, undergarments, and fingernail accessories expected of 
female adults.  
 A transgender person is a person whose sex is different from their 
gender identity.
19
 Transgender people face a litany of daily struggles. 
In addition to society’s direct mistreatment of transgender people for 
being different, such as staring or harassing,
20
 transgender people are 
forced to wrestle with the decision about where to use the bathroom in 
public multiple times per day. Because buildings in the United States 
                                                 
17
 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Health, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 





 What Does Transgender Mean? GLAAD (last visited Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.glaad.org/transgender/transfaq. 
20
 75% of transgender youth feel unsafe at school. See Issues: Youth & 
Students NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Oct. 3, 2017), 
http://www.transequality.org/issues/youth-students. 
5
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are designed to have bathrooms segregated by sex, transgender 
individuals are routinely forced into choosing which bathroom is 
appropriate. A female who identifies as a man, who may have had 
breast reduction surgery and years of hormone therapy causing a lower 
voice and more body and facial hair, typically feels more comfortable 
in the bathroom with other low-voiced, bearded people without 
breasts. For transgender individuals, going to the bathroom in 
accordance with gender identity is a vital aspect of transition.  
 In 2016, North Carolina passed a law banning cities from 
allowing transgender individuals to use public bathrooms in 
accordance with gender identity.
21
 Sixteen other states considered 
legislation restricting bathroom access to transgender people.
22
 These 
efforts to prevent transgender individuals from using bathrooms in 
accordance with their gender identity is indicative of conservative 
social pressures against transgender rights. A petition to boycott 
Target retail stores gathered over 1.5 million signatures after the store 
announced that it would permit transgender individuals to use the 
bathroom of their gender identity.
23
 The petition argues that the rule 
allows men to “simply say he ‘feels like a woman today’ and enter the 
women’s restroom”; it goes on to assert that such a policy “is exactly 
how sexual predators get access to their victims.”
24
 This animus 
against transgender people attempting to use the bathroom of their 
gender identity, or perhaps merely wanton disregard for the rights of 
transgender people in lieu of defending from the specter of sexual 
predators, has trickled down into public schools. One of those public 
                                                 
21
 Kopan, Tal, Scott, Eugene, North Carolina Governor Signs Controversial 
Transgender Bill,CNN [date], http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/north-
carolina-gender-bathrooms-bill/index.html 
22
 Kralik, Joellen ’Bathroom Bill’ Legislative Tracking, NATIONAL 








 Id.  
6
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schools is in the Kenosha Unified School District in Wisconsin, where 
transgender student Ashton Whitaker was subjected to his school’s 
unwritten rule that students must use the bathroom of their sex organs 




II. THE EVOLUTION OF TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 
 
Ashton Whitaker brought suit against the school district under 
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, 
et seq, (“Title IX”) and the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
26
 While some states 
have laws that may protect or restrict transgender rights, this Comment 
limits discussion to Title IX and the Equal Protections Clause in the 
context of transgender discrimination.  
 
A. Title IX Generally 
 
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 was 
enacted only eight years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil 
Rights Act spurred unprecedented workforce participation by women, 
who subsequently faced a significant earnings gap compared to male 
counterparts.
27
 The public began to realize that equal opportunity in 
the workplace did little help to women who had unequal opportunity 
in the education system.
28
 To remedy this problem, Congress passed 




Title IX provides, in part, that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
                                                 
25
 Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 
858 F.3d 1034, [page number] (7th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Aug. 28, 
2017) (No. 17-301).  
26
  Id. at 1042. 
27
 Title IX Legislative History DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, (last visited Nov. 21, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix#II.  
28
 Id.  
29
 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a). 
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the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
30
 Public 
schools, therefore, are prohibited from subjecting any person to 
separate or different rules, sanctions, or treatment on the basis of sex.
31
 
Title IX has been used, among other things, to prevent discrimination 
against pregnant women,
32
 inequitable funding of women’s athletic 
programs,
33




Because both Title VII and Title IX prohibit sex discrimination 
in various realms of the public, the Seventh Circuit has turned to Title 
VII jurisprudence in deciding Title IX cases and vice versa.
35
 The 
Seventh Circuit first dealt with gender identity discrimination in the 
context of a Title VII employment case in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 
Inc.
36
 That 1984 decision held that transsexuals
37
 were not protected 
under Title VII.
38
 In so deciding, the court noted that both the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits had already held that discrimination against 
transsexuals was not prohibited under Title VII.
39
 The Ulane court 
further reasoned that the plaintiff was discriminated against on the 
                                                 
30
 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a). 
31
 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(2)-(4).  
32
 See, e.g., North Haven Board of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (holding 
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy amounted to sex discrimination). 
33
 See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) 
(holding that a coach could bring suit on behalf of his girls’ basketball team inferior 
funding). 
34
 See, e.g., Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School Dist., 511 
F.3d 1114 ( 10th Cir. 2008).  
35
 Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist. Perry Tp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1023 (7th Cir. 
1997).  
36
 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
37
 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. The word “transsexuals” refers to transgender 
individuals who have already undergone sex reassignment surgery.  
38
  Id. at 1087. 
39
 Id. at 1086, citing Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 
(8th Cir. 1982) and Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-62 (9th 
Cir. 1977).   
8
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basis of being a transsexual, not on the basis of being a female or 
being a male.
40
 The court pointed to the lack of Congressional intent 
regarding transsexuals and determined that the plain language of the 
term “sex” did not allow for an interpretation that included 
discrimination on the basis of being a transsexual.
41
  
The Supreme Court brought sea change to Title VII sex 
discrimination analysis in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
42
 In Price 
Waterhouse, a female former employee of an accounting firm sued the 
firm for sex discrimination, arguing that she was denied promotion 
because she did not fit the stereotypical expectations of a female.
43
 Her 
supervisors complained of her conduct being “macho,” expressed 
distaste with her profanity “only because it was a lady using foul 
language,” and advised that she should “walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.”
44
 The Court declared: “we are beyond the 
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group.”
45
 This decision was the first to firmly establish that gender 
stereotyping is an actionable form of sex discrimination.
46
 
The Seventh Circuit applied the reasoning from Price 
Waterhouse to conclude that employers could not discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation in Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of 
Indiana.
47
 The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reasoned that an 
employer discriminating against a woman for being in a relationship 
                                                 
40
  Id. at 1087.  
41
 Id.  
42
 490 U.S. 228 (1989) superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1991), as stated in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 
251 (1994). 
43
  Id. at 235.  
44
  Id. at 235.  
45
 Id. at 231. 
46
 Id. at 258. 
47
 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Hively involved a professor at a 
college who was passed over for promotion on five occasions and alleged she was 
being discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation as a lesbian.  
9
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with a woman is engaging in sex discrimination because that employer 
would not discriminate against a man for being in a relationship with a 
woman.
48
 The court also compared sexual orientation discrimination 
to anti-miscegenation statutes prohibiting marriage between white 
people and black people that were held unconstitutional in Loving v. 
Virginia.
49
 In comparing the two cases, the Hively court noted that the 
Loving Court outright rejected the argument that the anti-
miscegenation statutes “punish equally both the white and the Negro 
participants in an interracial marriage.”
50
  Likewise, the Hively court 
rejected the argument that sexual orientation discrimination punished 
men and women equally for homosexuality.
51
 The Hively decision 
overruled a series of Seventh Circuit cases that held that sexual 
orientation discrimination was not prohibited under Title VII.
52
 
The Seventh Circuit is the only federal appellate court to apply 
the Price Waterhouse Title VII gender stereotyping framework to 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while some lower 
district courts have embraced the analysis.
53
 Less than a month before 
the Seventh Circuit decided Hively, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its 
decades of precedent that sexual orientation discrimination was not 
prohibited under Title VII.
54
 The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the 
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits also held that Title VII does not include sexual orientation 




 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
50
 Hively, 653 F.3d at 347 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 8). 
51
  Id. at 348.  
52
 See Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); Hamm v. 
Weyauwega Milk Prods., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir. 2002); Hamner v. St. Vincent 
Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford 
Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000). 
53
 Sprain, Pueschel, & Heyen, Seventh Circuit Court Rules Sexual Orientation 
is Protected Class: Kimberliy Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, THE 




 Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).  
10
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  In the context of transgender discrimination, 
however, the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have 





                                                 
55
 Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 
2017) (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (“Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual 
orientation.”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Simonton has 
alleged that he was discriminated against not because he was a man, but because of 
his sexual orientation. Such a claim remains non-cognizable under Title VII.”); 
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Title VII 
does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.”); Wrightson v. Pizza 
Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) 
(“Title VII does not afford a cause of action for discrimination based upon sexual 
orientation....”); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts under Title 
VII.”); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“[H]arassment based solely upon a person's sexual preference or 
orientation (and not on one's sex) is not an unlawful employment practice under Title 
VII.”); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(“Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals.”); Rene v. MGM 
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002) (A]n employee's sexual 
orientation is irrelevant for purposes of Title VII); Medina v. Income Support Div., 
413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII's protections, however, do not 
extend to harassment due to a person's sexuality). 
56
 The D.C. Circuit has not ruled on the issue. 
57
 See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–19 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that terminating an employee because she is transgender violates the prohibition on 
sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause following the reasoning 
of Price Waterhouse); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 573–75 (6th Cir. 
2004) (holding that transgender employee had stated a claim under Title VII based 
on the reasoning of Price Waterhouse); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 
213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a transgender individual could state a 
claim for sex discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act based on Price 
Waterhouse); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–03 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a transgender individual could state a claim under the Gender 
Motivated Violence Act under the reasoning of Price Waterhouse). 
11
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B. Equal Protection Clause Generally 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is 
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.”
58
 This provision protects against “intentional and 
arbitrary” discrimination.
59
 When a statute draws classifications 
between groups of people or sects, it is generally presumed to be 
lawful if the discriminatory practice is “rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”
60
 This rational basis test does not apply when 
the statute’s classification is based on sex,
61
 however, as sex-based 
classifications are subject to “heightened scrutiny.” 
62
 Courts reason 
that classifications on the basis of sex require heightened scrutiny 




In order to justify a classification on the basis of sex, the 
government must demonstrate that its justification for the 
classification is “exceedingly persuasive.”
64
 Therefore, this heightened 
standard requires the government to prove that its classification 
“serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory 
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”
65
 The difference between these two standards is 
significant. Determining whether to apply a rational basis test or 
heightened scrutiny to transgender discrimination cases essentially 
amounts to determining the winner of the case because the rational 
basis test is an extremely low bar for government actors to satisfy.
66
 
                                                 
58
 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, (1982)). 
59
 Vill. Of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).  
60






 Id.  
64
 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).  
65
 Id. at 524. 
66
 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989). 
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This burden for the government is so minimal that the Supreme Court 
has called rational basis “the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.”
67
 By contrast, 
classifications analyzed under heightened scrutiny present a 
significantly bigger hurdle.  
 
C. Title VII and Equal Protections Applied to Transgender 
Bathroom Rights 
 
In 2016, the Fourth Circuit addressed transgender public 
school bathroom rights in G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County 
School Bd.
68
 In Grimm, a transgender high school student challenged 
his school’s biological sex-based bathroom policy under the Equal 
Protections Clause and Title IX, arguing that the policy discriminated 
against him on the basis of sex and seeking injunctive relief to be 
allowed to use the bathroom in accordance with his gender identity.
69
 
The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the student’s claims 
on procedural grounds and remanded the case to the district court to 
reconsider the injunction.
70
 In his concurrence, Senior Circuit Judge 
Andre Davis argued that the Fourth Circuit “would be on sound 
ground in granting the requested preliminary injunction on the 
undisputed facts in the record.”
71
 That concurrence laid out the 
elements of a preliminary injunction and determined that the 
transgender student was likely to succeed on the merits of his Title IX 
claim.
72
 Neither the majority nor the concurrence addressed the equal 
protection claim, focusing instead on the Title IX claim in light of the 
Obama-appointed Department of Education’s recommended 
                                                 
67
 Id.  
68
 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369, (2016), and 
vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017). 
69




 Id. at 727 (Davis, J. concurring). 
72
 Id. (Davis, J. concurring). 
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 On remand, the district court granted the 
preliminary injunction and simply stated: “Judge Davis explained 
why.”
74
 The Fourth Circuit denied the school district’s motion to stay 
the injunction pending appeal.
75
 
The school district applied to recall and stay the preliminary 
injunction in the Supreme Court of the United States.
76
 Then, on 
August 3, 2016, a few weeks before the student, who identified as a 
boy, began his senior year of high school, the Supreme Court granted 
the application and stayed the preliminary injunction, forcing the boy 
to use the girls’ restroom.
77
 Justice Stephen Breyer penned a 
concurrence explaining his decision to force a transgender boy to use 
the girls’ bathroom until the Supreme Court got around to hearing the 
case, stating, “I vote to grant the application as a courtesy.”
78
 The 
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on October 28, 2016.
79
  
Before the Court could hear the case, however, the Justice 
Department and the Department of Education withdrew guidance to 
schools that interpreted Title IX to include transgender discrimination 
within the realm of sex discrimination.
80
 This revocation of regulatory 
guidance prompted the Court to vacate its grant of certiorari and 
remand the case to be considered in light of the new guidance.
81
 The 
student has since graduated from the high school, and his case has 




                                                 
73
 Id. at 710 (majority opinion).  
74
 G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15CV54, 2016 WL 3581852, at *1 
(E.D. Va. June 23, 2016), vacated, 853 F.3d 729 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Apr. 
18, 2017). 
75
 G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 654 F. App'x 606 (4th Cir. 2016). 
76
 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016). 
 
77
 Gloucester, 136 S. Ct. at 2442. 
 
78
 Id. (Breyer, J. Concurring). 
79
 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S.Ct. 369 (Mem) 
80
 STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL 
OF TITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 (D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633. 
81
 Gloucester, 137 S.Ct. 1239 (Mem). 
82
 Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 869 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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Accordingly, without guidance from regulatory bodies and without 
the Fourth Circuit’s determination, the issue was completely 
undecided before the Seventh Circuit heard Ash Whitaker’s case.  
 
III. ASH WHITAKER V. KENOSHA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Ashton Whitaker (“Ash”) is a high school student in the 
Kenosha Unified School District who was ultimately granted a 
preliminary injunction allowing him to use the bathroom of his gender 
identity.
83
 Ash was born female, but he identifies as man.
84
 During his 
freshman and sophomore years of high school, Ash changed his name 
legally and began to wear masculine clothing, cut his hair, use male 
pronouns, and request that teachers use male pronouns when referring 
to him.
85
  His therapist diagnosed him with Gender Dysphoria, which 
is recognized by the American Psychiatric Association as a medical 
classification of sex and gender identity conflict.
86
 The school notified 
Ash that despite his identity as a man, he was only permitted to use the 
girls’ restroom or a gender-neutral restroom far from his classrooms.
87
 
Ash feared that if he used the gender neutral bathroom and arrived late 
to the majority of his classes, he would draw more attention to his 
transition.
88
 Ash also noted that he felt using the girls’ bathroom 
undermined his gender identity.
89
 As a result, Ash resolved to avoid 
using the bathroom altogether and significantly reduced his water 
intake so that he could go all day without using the bathroom.
90
  
This restriction on his water intake caused medical problems 
such as fainting and seizures because Ash was diagnosed with 
                                                 
83
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 Moreover, Ash suffered from stress-related 
migraines, depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts as a result of the 
bathroom policy.
92
 Ash provided the school with a letter from his 
doctor recommending that Ash be allowed to use the boys’ restroom, 
but  the school did not waver from its position.
93
 Ash also submitted a 
letter from his counsel demanding that the school permit him to use 
the boys’ restroom, but the school responded by repeating its policy.
94
  
When these attempts to resolve the situation failed, Ash filed 
suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against the school district 
under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq, and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
95
 On the same day of filing, 
Ash moved for a preliminary injunction to allow him to use the boys’ 
restroom, pending the outcome of the litigation.
96
 The school district 
filed a motion to dismiss and a motion in opposition to the preliminary 
injunction.
97
   
The district court denied the school district’s motion to 
dismiss, finding that Ash alleged facts sufficient to support a claim of 
gender stereotyping under Price Waterhouse and that the school 
articulated “little in the way of a rational basis for the alleged 
discrimination” under Equal Protection Clause analysis. 
98
 Relying on 
                                                 
91
 Id. Vasovagal syncope is a malfunction in the nervous system that causes 
dilated blood vessels in the legs and slowed heart rate, causing reduced blood flow to 
the brain and subsequent fainting. See Mayo Clinic Staff, Vasovagal syncope, 
MAYO CLINIC (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/vasovagal-syncope/symptoms-causes/syc-
20350527https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/vasovagal-
syncope/symptoms-causes/syc-20350527.    
92












 Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., No. 16-CV-943-
PP, 2016 WL 5239829, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 22, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Whitaker By 
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 
2017). 
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that same reasoning, the district court granted Ash’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, enjoining the school district from: (1) denying 
him to use the boys’ restroom; (2) enforcing any policy against him 
that would prevent him from using the boys’ restroom; (3) disciplining 
him for using the boys’ restroom; and (4) monitoring his bathroom use 
in any way.
99




B. Seventh Circuit Analysis 
 
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the district court’s injunction 
grant by beginning with the basic requirements of a preliminary 
injunction.
101
 A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) 
that he will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief 
during the pendency of his action; (2) inadequate remedies at law 
exist; and (3) he has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits 
of his claims.
102
 If all three can be demonstrated, the court balances the 
potential harm to the moving party against potential harm to other 
parties or the public.
103
  
The court in Whitaker determined that the evidence of Ash’s 
medical conditions, coupled with the bathroom policy’s exacerbation 
of those medical conditions, was a sufficient showing of likelihood of 
irreparable harm.
104
 The court further pointed out that the school 
district’s decision to force Ash into far-away bathrooms that caused 
him to be late for class would “further stigmatize him and cause him to 
miss class time, or avoid the use of the bathroom altogether at the 
expense of his health.”
105
 The court then rejected the school district’s 
argument that any harm Ash may suffer could be remedied with 
                                                 
99




 Whitaker, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017). 
102




 Id. 1045.  
105
 Id.  
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 Ash had alleged prospective self-harm, 
including suicide, which would preclude any remedy at law.
107
 After 
establishing that Ash satisfied the first two elements required of a 
preliminary injunction, the court turned to the merits of Ash’s claim 





i. Title IX analysis 
 
The Whitaker court began its analysis by noting that courts in 
the Seventh Circuit look to Title VII in construing Title IX.
109
 The 
school district argued that the court should rely on Ulane, where the 
Seventh Circuit held that transsexuals are not protected under Title 
VII.
110
 The court conceded that some other courts agreed with the 
school district’s argument, only to emphatically reject that argument, 
simply stating: “We disagree.”
111
  The court dismantled the school 
district’s Ulane argument citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Price 
Waterhouse, which came five years after the Ulane decision: “this 
court and others have recognized a cause of action under Title VII 
when an adverse action is taken because of an employee’s failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes.”
112
 Moreover, the court reiterated that the 
Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that homosexuals discriminated 
against on the basis of their sexual orientation can state a Title VII 
claim on the basis of sex stereotyping.
113
 
                                                 
106
 Id.  
107




 Id. at 1047 (citing Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 
1023 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “it is helpful to look to Title VII to determine 
whether the alleged sexual harassment is severe and pervasive enough to constitute 
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The school district argued that Ash could not show a likelihood 
of success because its unwritten policy “is not based on whether the 
student behaves, walks, talks, or dresses in a manner that is 
inconsistent with any preconceived notions of sex stereotypes.”
114
 In 
rebuttal, the court explained that transgender individuals do not 
conform to the sex-based stereotypes of their birth sex, adding that the 
Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have also recognized the transgender sex-
stereotyping cause of action under Title VII.
115
 The court held that Ash 
could demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his Title IX 
claim because he alleged that the school district denied him access to 




ii. Equal Protection Claim 
 
Once the court determined a likelihood of success on the merits 
of the Title IX claim, it was unnecessary to even address the Equal 
Protection claim because the injunction would be permissibly granted 
under any likely successful theory of recovery.
117
 However, the court 
addressed the Equal Protection claim nonetheless.
118
 In this endeavor, 
the court deviated from the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Grimm, 
where the injunction analysis was limited to a Title IX claim under the 
Department of Justice’s interpretation of the word “sex.”
119
  
In analyzing the Equal Protection claim, the Whitaker court 
refused to apply a rational basis test, reasoning that transgender 
individuals are a suspect class in light of the historical discrimination 
against them based on immutable characteristics of their gender 
identities.
120
 The court noted that because the bathroom policy could 




 Id. at 1048 (citing Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); and 
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
116
 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1048. 
117




 Grimm, 822 F.3d at 710. 
120
 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1052. 
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not even be articulated without mentioning sex, it was inherently 
based on a sex-classification triggering heightened scrutiny.
121
  
Under a heightened scrutiny standard, the school district had 
the burden of showing that its justification for its bathroom policy was 
both genuine and exceedingly persuasive.
122
 However, the school 
district had difficulty articulating why its bathroom policy justification 
was genuine and exceedingly persuasive. The court’s opinion borders 
on harsh in its continued outright rejection of each proffered reason.
123
 
First, the court discussed the procedural requirements of the bathroom 
policy, which the court reiterated was an unwritten policy.
124
 The 
school district alleged that the unwritten policy required students to 
use the restroom of their birth certificate, but the court pointed out that 
Wisconsin birth certificates require sex-assignment surgery (a 
procedure only available to adults) to alter sex classification, 
ultimately precluding Ash from taking advantage of such an option.
125
  
Moreover, the court argued that a Minnesota student could 
have a birth certificate changed without any surgery, and that if a 
Minnesota student moved to the Kenosha school district with the 
appropriate birth certificate and not the appropriate genital organs for 
the bathroom policy, the entire policy would be undermined.
126
 This 
disconnect between policy and practice illustrated to the court that the 
policy was more arbitrary than it was reasonable.
127
 Finally, the court 
noted that the school district does not even require birth certificates for 
enrolment, and will accept a passport as identification.
128
 Because the 
State Department only requires a doctor’s note to alter sex 
classification, the court found that the school district’s requirements 
based on the birth certificate instead of the passport even further 
                                                 
121
 Id. at 1051. 
122
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demonstrated that the policy was more likely driven by arbitrary 
animus rather than genuine and exceedingly persuasive justification.
129
 
Another point the court offered involved no actual analysis of 
the specific facts of Whitaker, but instead focused on the practical use 
of bathrooms in general.
130
 The court posited that a transgender 
student’s presence in the restroom “provides no more of a risk to other 
students’ privacy rights than the presence of an overly curious student 
of the same biological sex who decides to sneak glances at his 
classmates.”
131
 The school district’s only reasoning for its argument 
that transgender students invade the privacy of other students was that 
the transgender students possess physically different genitals than the 
other students in the bathroom of their choosing.
132
 The court 
countered that the school makes no effort to provide separate 
restrooms for pre-pubescent boys and girls from those who have gone 
through puberty even though they have significantly different sex 
organs.
133
 This point draws on the commonsense notion that most 
Americans never see anyone’s genitals in the bathroom. Without any 
commonsense, reasonable, or persuasive justifications for the 
regulation of bathroom use, the school district failed to demonstrate 
why its sex classification was permissible under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  
 
iii. Balance of harms favor Ash 
 
Having established the elements of a preliminary injunction, 
the court moved on to discussing the balance of harms between the 
public good and Ash Whitaker’s likely prospective harm.
134
 Once a 
moving party has met its burden of establishing the threshold 
requirements for a preliminary injunction, the court must balance the 
                                                 
129
 Id. at 1053. 
130
 Id.  
131
 Id. at 1052. 
132




 Id.  
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harms faced by both parties and the public.
135
 The court brought 
powerful and pragmatic reasoning to the table in finding that Ash was 
substantially more likely to suffer harm than the public.  
The school district argued that the injunction’s harm would 
extend to a violation of the “privacy” of its 22,160 students in the 
district.
136
 It argued that allowing a transgender student to use a 
bathroom that did not conform with birth sex would disrupt the 
privacy of other students using the same bathroom.
137
 The school 
district also levied the argument that the injunction harms the public as 
a whole because it would force other school districts to also risk being 
in violation of Title IX, thereby placing federal funding at risk.
138
  
The Seventh Circuit emphatically disagreed. First, the court 
noted that Ash used the boys’ bathroom for six months without any 
incident, and that it was only when a teacher, not a student, reported 
Ash to school administrators that the school took notice.
139
 In fact, the 
school district made no showing of any student complaint about Ash at 
any point before or during litigation, which effectively removed any 
possibility of arguing that Ash’s presence in the boys’ room bothered 
any students whatsoever.
140
 In response to the school district’s 
argument that the preliminary injunction infringed upon the parents’ 
ability to direct the education of their children, the court simply stated 
that the school district offered “no evidence that a parent has ever 
asserted this right. These claims are all speculative.”
141
  
Next, the court referenced the amici briefs of school administrators 
from twenty-one states, who together were responsible for educating 
                                                 
135
 Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S. of Am., Inc., 
549 F.3d 1079, 1100 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 
656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015). 
136
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approximately 1.4 million students.
142
 The amici statements 
emphatically and uniformly agreed that “the frequently-raised and 
hypothetical concerns about a policy that permits a student to utilize a 
bathroom consistent with his or her gender have simply not 
materialized.”
143
 This finding poked a major hole in the Kenosha 
School District’s argument that allowing Ash Whitaker to use the 
boys’ bathroom would harm the public.  
These minor grievances based on hypothetical concerns that 
never tangibly materialized were scant justification for refusing to 
grant the injunction in the face of the overwhelming evidence that 
using the incorrect bathroom harmed Ash on a medical, emotional, 
social, and physical level. Accordingly, the court granted the 
preliminary injunction and signaled to school districts across the 
Seventh Circuit that transgender bathroom policies would not fare well 
in federal courts within the Seventh Circuit. The school district then 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United 




IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT REASONING UNDER ATTACK 
 
The Seventh Circuit has laid out a perfect roadmap for any 
court addressing transgender bathroom rights in public schools. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s stay of injunction in the Fourth 
Circuit case Grimm v. Gloucester County is a concerning forecast of 
possible infringements on transgender rights. These threats to 
transgender rights go beyond the judiciary.
145
 The Trump 
administration mounts pressure against schools as the Department of 




 Id.  at 1055. 
144
 Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 
858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 28, 2017) (No. 17-301).  
145
 STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL 
OF TITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 (D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633; see also Tillett, 
Emily, Trump Announces Military Ban on Transgender Service Members, CBS 
NEWS (July 26, 2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-announces-ban-on-
transgender-service-members-in-military-twitter/. 
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Education and Department of Justice retreat from the pro-transgender 
rights position of the Obama administration.
146
 
On February 22, 2017, the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Education revoked the Obama-era Title IX guidance on 
transgender student bathroom use that interpreted “sex discrimination” 
to include transgender discrimination.
147
 On July 26, 2017, the sitting 
President of the United States announced that transgender individuals 
would no longer be permitted in the military, a major departure from 
the status quo under the Obama administration.
148
 On October 5, 2017, 
the Attorney General Jeffrey Beauregard Sessions announced that the 
Department of Justice would reverse its guidance on Title VII, stating 
that Title VII also does not apply to gender identity discrimination.
149
  
As the executive branch shows its hand as hostile towards 
transgender rights, the Supreme Court has not made any rulings on the 
issue since its stay of injunction in Gloucester County.
150
 Despite these 
forces opposing transgender rights, the Seventh Circuit is a guiding 
light for courts deciding this issue. The arguments levied against the 
Seventh Circuit in amicus briefs submitted in favor of the school 
district’s petition for a writ of certiorari, however, pose an acute threat 
to transgender students across the country if heeded by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.  
 
  
                                                 
146
STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL 
OF TITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 (D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633; see also Tillett, 
Emily, Trump Announces Military Ban on Transgender Service Members, CBS 
NEWS (July 26, 2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-announces-ban-on-
transgender-service-members-in-military-twitter/. 
147
 STATEMENT BY ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL 
OF TITLE IX GUIDANCE, DOJ 17-214 (D.O.J.), 2017 WL 696633. 
148
 Tillett, Emily, Trump Announces Military Ban on Transgender Service 
Members, CBS NEWS (July 26, 2017) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-
announces-ban-on-transgender-service-members-in-military-twitter/. 
149
 Moreau, Julie, Federal Civil Rights Law Doesn’t Protect Transgender 




 Gloucester County, 137 S. Ct. at 369. 
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A. The “Animus Briefs” 
 
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the Kenosha school 
district noted the Grimm decision and enticed the Court with an 
opportunity to address the case again:  
 
This issue is not new to this Court. In 
Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. 
Grimm this Court granted review to 
address, in part, the Department of 
Education’s interpretation of Title IX 
that funding recipients providing sex-
separated facilities must generally treat 
transgender students consistent with 
their gender identity. When the 
Department of Education’s guidance 
was later withdrawn, this Court was 
deprived of an opportunity to address 
these issues and the case was remanded 
to the Fourth Circuit. This case provides 
the Court with a clean vehicle to decide 
the same underlying important issues 
without the additional, complicating 
layers related to addressing 




In the intervening month, nine amici curiae briefs were filed 
by parties in opposition to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling.
152
 The 
                                                 
151
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. ii.  
152
 See generally Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha v. Whitaker (No. 17-301); Brief for 
the Michigan Association of Christian Law Schools et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha. v. Whitaker, (No. 17-301); Brief for the 
Foundation for Moral Law et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha 
v. Whitaker, (No. 17-301); Brief for the Concerned Women For America, et al. as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha v. Whitaker, No. 17-301 (petition 
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organizations filing the briefs were notable conservative interest 
groups, including The Family Research Council,
153
 The Eagle Forum 
Education & Legal Defense Fund,
154
 Michigan Association of 
Christian Schools,
155
 The Foundation for Moral Law,
156157
 and 
Concerned Women for America.
158
 Many of these briefs displayed 
profound insensitivity or misunderstanding about transgender rights 
issues. One amicus brief, submitted by Citizens United
159
 and more 
aptly called an “animus brief,” referred to Ash Whitaker as “she”
160
 
and began its argument by stating that “Plaintiff Ash Whitaker is a girl 
who currently self-identifies as a boy.”
161
 The Citizens United brief is 
a picture-perfect example of animus towards transgender individuals.  
The Citizens United brief justified its use of “she” in reference 
to Ash by stating, “[t]o do otherwise sacrifices the plain meaning of 
                                                                                                                   
for cert. filed Aug. 25, 2017); Brief for Citizens United, et al. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Kenosha v. Whitaker, No. 17-301 (petition for cert. filed 
Aug. 25, 2017); Brief for William J. Bennett as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Kenosha v. Whitaker, No. 17-301 (petition for cert. filed Aug. 25, 2017). 
153
 Brief for Family Research Council, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Kenosha v. Whitaker, No. 17-301 (petition for cert. filed Aug. 25, 2017).   
154
 Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at n. 152. 
155
Brief for the Michigan Association of Christian Law Schools, supra at n. 
152. 
156
 Brief for the Foundation for Moral Law, supra at n. 152.  
157
 The Foundation for Moral Law was founded by former Alabama state judge 
Roy S. Moore, who was twice removed from the Alabama Supreme Court for 
violating the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics. Judge Moore has been in the 
national spotlight for soliciting sex from underage girls. See Ruhle, Stephanie, 




 Brief for the Concerned Women For America, supra at n. 152.  
159
 Citizens United is a conservative nonprofit organization. See generally, 
About, CITIZENS UNITED (last visited Nov. 21, 2017) 
http://www.citizensunited.org/index.aspx. 
160
 Citizens United is not alone in calling Ash “she” despite his gender identity. 
The Foundation for Moral Law submitted a brief calling Ash “she” throughout. See 
Brief for the Foundation for Moral Law, supra at n. 152.  
161
 Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152.  
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the English language on the altar of political correctness.”
162
 After 
establishing that it would refuse to call Ash “he,” the Citizens United 
brief went on to compare the plaintiff in Gloucester County to Ash 
Whitaker, cynically calling their suits against their schools “test 
cases.”
163
 More concerning, it stated: “it should not come as a surprise 
that a female plaintiff was selected in each case. A boy in his senior 
year of high school who would seek to spend time in the girls’ 
restroom would have presented the circuit court with a very different 
set of facts and concerns.”
164
 It did not explain what “different set of 
facts and concerns” would be at issue if Ash were born male and had a 
doctor’s diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and instead left the grim 
implications to the reader’s imagination.
165
 
Another alarming argument Citizens United offered in its 
“animus brief” was that the Seventh Circuit “failed to consider the 
harm being done to Ash Whitaker by her mother, her counselors, and 
her physicians” by treating her with hormone therapy.
166
 It did not 
explain how the medical treatment Ash received was relevant to the 
restroom litigation.
167
 The brief went on for pages with subversive, 
malicious comments, including: “transgender persons are not suicidal 
because they are discriminated against, but because they suffer from a 
mental illness;”
168
 “in countless transgender cases across the country, 
the ‘suicide card’ is being played;”
169
 and “what is to stop the varsity 
boys’ lacrosse team from deciding en masse that they are all girls, and 




                                                 
162








 Id. at 9.   
167
 Id.  
168
 Id. at 18. 
169
 Id. at 15.  
170
Id. at 11.  
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These stances frame the primary arguments brought against the 
Seventh Circuit in the “animus” briefs, which are essentially as 
follows: (1) the “plain meaning” or “plain text” of Title IX does not 
apply to transgender bathroom rights, which is illustrated in Citizens 
United’s refusal to even call Ash “he” in the name of “political 
correctness”; (2) gender dysphoria is a mental illness and should be 
treated as a disability by law, which is illustrated in Citizens United’s 
argument that Ash’s mother and doctors are doing him harm in 
treating him with hormone therapy; and (3) permitting transgender 
individuals to use the restroom of their gender identity will enable 
sexual predators to victimize women more often, which is illustrated 
in Citizens United’s cryptic warning that Ash’s case would contain a 
“different set of facts and concerns” if Ash were born male and 
transitioned to a woman.  
 
i. The “plain meaning” argument 
 
One common argument in the amici briefs was that the plain 
language of Title IX refers to discrimination on the basis of biological 
sex and not on the basis of gender identity.
171
 This argument is an 
attack on the way the Seventh Circuit applied Price Waterhouse Title 
VII sex-stereotyping framework to Title IX transgender bathroom 
rights. William J. Bennett, who the New York Times once named the 
“leading spokesman of the Traditional Values wing of the Republican 
Party,”
172
 argued in an amici brief he submitted in support of the 
school district that proscribing “on the basis of sex” is a question of 
statutory interpretation.
173
 In support of this argument, Bennett went 
through the standard cannons of construction, spanning fourteen 
pages, from dictionary definitions to legislative history, ultimately 
arriving at the conclusion that Congress intended the word “sex” to 
                                                 
171
 Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152; Brief for Citizens United, 
supra at n. 152; Brief for the Michigan Association of Christian Law Schools supra 
at n. 152; Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund supra at n. 152.  
172
 Bennett, William, About Bill Bennett, BILL BENNETT SHOW (Feb. 2017) 
https://billbennettshow.com/bio/.  
173
 Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152. 
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refer to biological and physiological sex.
174
 After firmly establishing 
that Congress intended to refer to biological and physiological sex 
instead of gender identity, Bennett never stated how or why this fact 




The Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund
176
 also 
argued that the “plain meaning” of Title IX refers to biological sex.
177
 
The Eagle Forum argued that in light of the fact that Title IX was 
intended to refer to biological sex and not gender identity, the 
“Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Price Waterhouse and its progeny is 
also misplaced.”
178
 It went on to state that regulating “how boys and 
girls dress (e.g. clothing, jewelry, hair length) differs fundamentally 
from segregating restrooms by sex.”
179
 Its analysis was limited to the 
facts of Price Waterhouse itself,
180
 arguing that the plaintiff in Price 
Waterhouse who employers thought too masculine for a woman “still 




ii. The “transgender people are mentally ill” argument 
 
Like the Citizens United “animus” brief, the Eagle Forum brief 
also argued that Ash Whitaker has a “disability.”
182
 Applying this 
                                                 
174
 Id. at 5-19. 
175
 Id. at 19. 
176
 The Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund is a conservative 
interest group and states on its website, “we oppose liberal propaganda in the 
curriculum through global education and Political Correctness.”  See Description, 
EAGLE FORUM (last visited Nov. 21, 2017) http://eagleforum.org/misc/descript.html. 
177
 Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at n. 152.    
178
 Id. at 14. 
179
 Id.   
180
 Eagle Forum curiously refers to the famous Price Waterhouse case as 
“Hopkins,” even though most federal judges would recognize the well-known case 
as “Price Waterhouse.” One can only speculate as to why Eagle Forum would seek 
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logic, it asserted that Ash should have to exhaust the remedies of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act before filing suit.
183
 The 
Eagle Fund brief did not go as far as the Citizens United brief’s 
outright claim that all transgendered people are mentally ill,
184
 but 
instead posited, “whether or not [sic] transgenderism per se remains a 
disorder under current medical views, Whitaker’s condition – with 
migraines, depression, anxiety, and suicide ideation—nonetheless 
potentially could qualify [as a disability].”
185
 It did not analyze the 
definition of “disability” under the IDEA, nor how a transgender 
person may or may not fit that definition, despite the fact that the other 




Applying this reasoning to the Equal Protection claim, the 
Eagle Forum argued that Ash was discriminated against on the basis of 
“disability,” which is not a suspect class under Equal Protection 
Clause jurisprudence.
187
 The Eagle Forum rejected the notion that Ash 
was discriminated against on the basis of sex and rejected the use of 
heightened scrutiny in analyzing the classification-based regulation of 
bathrooms.
188
  Under rational basis review nearly any regulation is 
permissible so long as it is merely rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.
189
 The privacy of other students is a legitimate 
governmental interest, so a policy that is simply rationally related to 




 Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152 (“it appears to be the modus 
operandi of the transgender movement across the country – to claim suicidal 
feelings, brought on by various defendants”). 
185
 Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at n. 152. 
186
 The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101- 12213 (“ADA”) 
expressly excludes “transsexualism” from the definition of “disability” under ADA. 
See 42 U.S.C. §12211(b)(1). 
187
 Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at 16; see 
also Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-67 (2001) (holding that disability is 
not a suspect class and should be analyzed under rational basis review). 
188
 Brief for Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, supra at n. 152. 
189
 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992).  
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such a goal would pass the rational basis test.
190
 A policy that demands 
sex-segregated bathrooms would almost certainly meet that criteria in 
most courts and would be permissible under the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
 
iii. The scare-tactics argument 
 
The most prevalent argument proffered in the “animus” briefs 
played to speculative fear of transgender people generally as well as 
policies involving transgender bathroom use.
191
 The Foundation for 
Moral Law brief’s entire first argument was that if schools implement 
such bathroom policies, “the number of students claiming such rights 
is likely to increase.”
192
 It cited several studies pointing to the gradual 
increase of openly transgender people, arguing that “[i]n earlier times, 
youths who felt such [transgender] impulses were possibly more likely 
to keep quiet about them.”
193
 It concluded, “[t]hus, the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision, if not reversed, could have the effect of 
encouraging students to question gender identity and to take steps to 
act on those thoughts.”
194
 It did not explain why encouraging students 
to ponder gender identity is inherently negative, but instead relied on 
the assumption that any reader would be able to infer that transgender 
people are somehow inferior.
195
 
In addition to the fear of transgenderism in general, these 
“animus” briefs make outlandish arguments that permitting 
transgender individuals to use the bathroom of their gender identity 
will enable sexual predators to more easily victimize women in 
                                                 
190
 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, U.S. 602, 626 (1989) (holding that 
protecting privacy is a legitimate government interest). 
191
 Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152; Brief for Citizens United, 
supra at n. 152; Brief for the Concerned Women For America, supra at n. 152; Brief 
for the Foundation for Moral Law, supra at n. 152.   
192
 Id. at 3. 
193
 Id. at 4. 
194
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bathrooms, locker rooms, showers, and dressing rooms.
196
 This 
argument echoes that of the aforementioned petition to boycott Target 
retail stores when it implemented a pro-transgender bathroom policy 
nationwide. Even though Ash Whitaker’s case was explicitly about 
using the bathroom and the parties stipulated that Ash does not use the 
school’s locker rooms, showers, or dressing rooms, these briefs 
overwhelmingly analyzed the speculative danger of transgender 
bathroom policies specifically in the context of locker rooms and 
dressing rooms.  
The Concerned Women for America
197
 animus brief 
unironically invoked its own gender identity by arguing that the 
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in favor of Ash’s gender identity is a safety 
concern: “[a]s the nation’s largest public policy women’s organization, 
your Amicus is vitally concerned that Title IX’s privacy and safety 
protections for female (and male) students not be stripped away.”
198
 
Without ever explaining why a pro-transgender bathroom policy 
would affect bathroom safety, the Concern Women’s brief asserted 
that two of its leaders have been sexually assaulted (one of whom was 
videotaped in a women’s bathroom when she was a teenager, decades 
before any sort of transgender bathroom law)
199
 and proceeded to list 
three separate instances in which Target stores had problems of 
“peeping toms” after it implemented its transgender bathroom 
policy.
200
 It did not state whether these three instances were more than 
the usual amount of instances. Aside from this handful of anecdotes, 
the brief did not provide any statistical data to prove that transgender 
                                                 
196
 Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152; Brief for Citizens United, 
supra at n. 152; Brief for the Concerned Women For America, supra at n. 152; Brief 
for the Foundation for Moral Law, supra at n. 152.  
197
 Concerned Women for America is a conservative nonprofit “built on prayer 
and action.” See generally, https://concernedwomen.org/about/ (“We believe 
marriage is between one man and one woman, that sexual activity outside of that 
marriage is sin, and that God created the human race male and female.”). 
198
 Brief for the Concerned Women For America, supra at n. 152. 
199
 Id. at 6-7. 
200
 Id. at 9. 
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bathroom policies could possibly lead to an increase in bathroom 
sexual assault, and instead relied on the reader’s inference.  
William J. Bennett’s brief better articulated the fear-mongering 
offered in the Concerned Women brief and at least granted the 
concession that it is not transgender individuals themselves who pose a 
safety concern, but non-transgender sexual predators who would take 
advantage of the opportunity to enter a bathroom of the opposite 
sex.
201
 Bennett argued transgender bathroom policies could be 
“exploited by non-transgender sexual predators who falsely assert” 
that they are transgender.
202
 Bennett then cited six occasions in which 
transgender bathroom policies were allegedly exploited by sexual 
deviants, including one where a man ran into the women’s locker 
room and stripped naked, screaming that he was allowed to be there in 
light of the new rule.
203
 To magnify the horror of the handful of 
instances cited, Bennett points out that studies show two-thirds of 
sexual assault instances go unreported, bringing the speculative total to 
a mere eighteen.
204
 Yet, like the Concerned Women’s brief, Bennett’s 
brief did not point to any statistics, studies, or data that demonstrate 
that pro-transgender bathroom policies would have any effect on the 
number of sexual assaults in restrooms.  
 
B. The Flawed Reasoning in the “Animus” Briefs 
 
Each of the three primary arguments raised in the several 
“animus” briefs are fundamentally flawed. First, the plain language of 
Title IX referring to biological sex has no bearing on whether the 
school district relied on sex stereotyping in forcing Ash to use the 
restroom that his sex stereotypically uses. Second, gender dysphoria is 
not a mental illness, and even if it is, it certainly does not amount to a 
                                                 
201




 Id. at 21; see also Bult, Laura, Seattle Man Undresses in Women’s Locker 
Room at Local Pool To Test New Transgender Bathroom Rule, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Feb. 17, 2016) http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/wa-man-women-
bathroom-test-transgender-ruling-article-1.2535150. 
204
 Brief for William J. Bennett, supra at n. 152. 
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disability because it does not impair any major life activity and it is 
explicitly excluded from federal disability legislation. Third, there is 
no evidence of transgender bathroom policies causing an increase in 
instances of sexual assault.  
  
i. The “plain meaning” argument does not rebut the 
Seventh Circuit ruling 
 
Even if one accepts at face value the notion that Title IX and 
Title VII apply only to sex-based discrimination, the sex-stereotyping 
cause of action recognized in Price Waterhouse nonetheless 
accommodates transgender discrimination claims. As the Seventh 
Circuit properly noted in Whitaker, the school district attempted to 
force Ash to use the restroom in accordance with the stereotype 
expected of his birth sex.
205
 Moreover, the school district explicitly 
used the word “sex” in its unwritten policy, which demonstrated that 
the policy was clearly sex-based.
206
 
Furthermore, arguing that the policy treats males and females 
equally is no more persuasive than the arguments for anti-
miscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia, where Virginia argued 
that the law punished whites and blacks equally for interracial 
marriage.
207
  The Loving court outright rejected that argument.
208
 
Likewise, the argument that is grounded in the idea that the bathroom 
policy punishes males and females equally for using the opposite 
bathroom should be rejected as a futile attempt to discriminate on the 
basis of gender identity. 
Finally, although Citizens United argues that calling Ash “he” 
is to “sacrifice the plain meaning of the English Language at the altar 
of political correctness,”
209
 referring Ash as “he” is wholly within the 
confines of the plain meaning of English. Ash presents himself as a 
                                                 
205




 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
208
 Id.  
209
 Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152. 
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man, dresses like a man, calls himself a man, and styles his hair like a 
man.
210
 Accordingly, he is a man, and calling him “he” is no sacrifice 





ii. Gender dysphoria is not a mental illness and is not a 
disability under the law 
 
Because gender roles are no more than social constructs,
212
 the 
refusal to conform to gender roles cannot logically be a mental illness. 
In fact, according to the American Psychiatric Association, “gender 
nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder.”
213
 Therefore, gender 
dysphoria is not a mental disorder.  
However, even if one assumes that gender nonconformity is a 
mental illness, it certainly does not fit the legal requirements of a 
disability. A disability, generally, is a physical or mental impairment 
that limits one or more life activities.
214
 Nothing about transitioning 
genders impairs anything about a transgender person’s life. If 
anything, it frees them from the constraints of society’s arbitrary 
stereotypes and expectations of their birth sex. The only impairment to 
a transgender person’s life from gender dysphoria is societal 
harassment, like that exhibited in the “animus” briefs. Therefore, 
because transgender people are not disabled, the argument that Ash 
should file under the IDEA also fails.  
 
  
                                                 
210
 Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1038. 
211
 Brief for Citizens United, supra at n. 152.  
212
 See generally, Section II. 
213
 DSM-5: Gender Dysphoria, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 2013 
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iii. Pro-Transgender Bathroom Policies Are Not a Safety 
Threat. 
 
The argument that transgender bathroom policies are likely to 
increase bathroom sexual assault is unconvincing because there is no 
evidence demonstrating the speculative fear whatsoever. The handful 
of anecdotes the various briefs cite are no more than anecdotes and do 
nothing to show a trend or correlation, much less causation. This fear-
based argument should fail immediately with such a vacancy of 
evidence.  
Finally, to answer the Citizen United question, “what is to stop 
the varsity boys’ lacrosse team from deciding en masse that they are 
all girls, and barging into the girls’ locker room while the cheerleading 
squad is changing clothes?”
215
 Simply put, the answer would be “a 
note from a doctor diagnosing gender dysphoria,” which is what Ash 
Whitaker immediately provided his school upon beginning his 
transition.
216
 But Citizens United appears too wrapped up in animus to 
parse legal issues in this submission to the highest court in the United 
States. The Seventh Circuit addressed this disingenuous argument in 
Whitaker, which Citizens United must have missed: “[t]his is not a 
case where a student has merely announced that he is a different 
gender. Rather, Ash has a medically diagnosed and documented 
condition. Since his diagnosis, he has consistently lived in accordance 
with his gender identity.”
217
 For the Citizens United brief to simply 
toss Ash in with the hypothetical sexually predatory athletes “barging” 
in on unsuspecting and vulnerable cheerleaders is a gross 
mischaracterization of Ash’s simple request to go the bathroom with 
the other boys.  
 
  
                                                 
215
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216
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The legal groundwork upon which the Seventh Circuit came to 
its decision in Whitaker is unassailable. In order to come to another 
conclusion, a court deciding these issues must deviate from that firm 
reasoning. As such, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis should serve as a 
guiding light to other courts presiding over transgender bathroom 
rights litigation. Regardless of the current political atmosphere, or of 
the ongoing animus against transgender individuals displayed in the 
“animus” briefs, the judicial branch must stand undeterred. The 
executive branch and the legislative branch may test the judiciary’s 
protections of transgender rights with statutes, regulatory 
interpretations, and executive orders, but the analysis should remain 
the same: forcing individuals to use certain bathrooms that violate 
their gender identity is no different than sex stereotyping in any other 
context. The Supreme Court of the United States should find the same.  
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